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abstract
Mental health research faces a suite of unresolved challenges that have contributed to a stagnation of 
research efforts and treatment innovation. One such challenge is how to reliably and validly account 
for the subjective side of patient symptomatology, that is, the patient’s inner experiences or patient 
phenomenology. Providing a structured, standardised semantics for patient phenomenology would 
enable future research in novel directions. In this contribution, we aim at initiating a standardized 
approach to patient phenomenology by sketching a tentative formalisation within the framework of an 
applied ontology, in the broader context of existing open-source Open Biomedical Ontologies resources 
such as the Mental Functioning Ontology. We further discuss a number of prevailing challenges and 
observations bearing on this task.
keywords
patient phenomenology, symptomatology, applied ontology, big data, classification
RASMUS ROSENBERG LARSEN
University of Toronto Mississauga
rosenberg.larsen@utoronto.ca
JANNA HASTINGS
University College London
j.hastings@ucl.ac.uk
201
MAPPING THE PATIENT’S EXPERIENCE
If psychopathology is reduced to a list of commonsensically derived and simplified 
operational features, further progress of pathogenetic research will be seriously 
impeded. What is needed is a complex psychopathology capable of mediating between 
symptom level and process level, and of developing models of the inherent structure 
and possible disturbances of conscious experience. 
(Fuchs 2010, p. 269)
Disabilities related to mental health are among the overall fastest growing threats to global 
health (Patel, et al. 2018; Whiteford, et al. 2013). According to the World Health Organization, 
depression is “the leading cause of disability worldwide” (WHO 2017). While the growing 
challenge of mental health is evidently perpetuated by a number of complex and unique 
variables, such as limited access to efficient treatments (Wainberg, et al. 2017), recent 
observations also point to a more fundamentally troubling aspect of the problem, namely, a 
stagnation of scientific progress in understanding mental disease and disorder, paralleled by a 
halt in treatment innovation (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Frances, 2014; Nemeroff, 2013).
This stagnation of research progress is arguably attributable in part to unresolved issues 
pertaining to the diagnosis and classification of conditions and symptoms affecting mental 
health (Insel, et al. 2010; Lilienfeld, Smith & Watts, 2013; North & Surís, 2017). There is 
widespread disagreement on how to define and delineate psychiatric illness in general (e.g. 
Kendler, Zachar & Craver, 2011; Lilienfeld, Smith & Watts, 2013), how to classify individual 
diagnoses and symptoms (e.g. Clark et al., 2017), and there is even disagreement on whether 
psychiatric phenomena can at all be reliably defined (e.g. Kendler, 2016; Wrigley, 2007). Aside 
from these unresolved issues, the current practice is to use operationalized or utility-driven 
tools to demarcate the scientific and clinical subject-matter, but these are contested as to their 
validity, i.e. their ability to reliably pick out real shared pathology (e.g. Kendell & Jablensky, 
2003). If uncertainty exists on how to classify an instance of, say, depression and its individual 
symptoms, how would it then be possible to find a proper research sample for scientific 
experimentation or treatment development? Trivially, the quality of research and psychiatric 
efforts is directly dependent on the quality of diagnostic classification and symptomatology.
One aspect of improving diagnostic classification in psychiatry is determining how to reliably 
and validly account for, and do justice to, the subjective side of patient symptomatology, 
that is, the patient’s intimate experiences of her/his symptoms, often referred to as patient 
1. Introduction
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phenomenology (e.g. Fuchs, 2010; Parnas & Zahavi, 2002; Parnas et al., 2013; Patrick & Hajcak, 
2016). Indeed, although psychiatric illness must be assumed to be robustly rooted in biological 
processes (and researchers are right to include such aspects in diagnostic classifications as 
far as they have been determined), psychiatric illness is qualitatively different from purely 
somatic illnesses in that the details of the patient’s subjective experience is an unavoidable 
source of evidence relevant for etiological research and treatment innovation (e.g. Fernandez, 
2018; Messas, Tamelini, Mancini & Stanghellini, 2018; Stanghellini & Rosfort, 2013). Put simply, 
where the experiences of nausea, headache and fatigue can be important indicators for the 
diagnosis of diabetes, they are not in themselves considered fundamental for diabetes research 
or treatment. By contrast, meticulous attention to qualitative differences in patient symptoms 
and experiences are central in demarcating the severity of a mental health condition (e.g. 
how depressed is the patient?), or to distinguish one type of disorder from another (e.g. 
differentiating between neurosis and psychosis).
While some aspects of patient phenomenology are included as symptoms in diagnostic 
classifications, the focus is usually on tracking outwardly observed behaviours. But more 
fundamentally, as some researchers have noted, the presiding approach to psychiatric 
classification is to describe its subject-matter in a third person perspective, that is, through 
the eyes of the healthcare professional or clinical observer (e.g. Fernandez, 2018; Fuchs, 
2010; Pallagrosi, Picardi, Fonzi & Biondi, 2018; Parnas, Sass & Zahavi, 2013). So even when a 
diagnostic classification includes patient phenomenology, it usually does so in a simplistic 
observational manner that is poorly representative of the patient’s actual, subjective 
experience (e.g. Høffding & Martiny, 2015).
According to Thomas Fuchs (2010), a consequence of lacking a sufficiently detailed description 
of patient phenomenology in research settings is that the gap between symptom and explanation 
widens. Effectively, this means that the diagnostic terminology and causal explanations 
that the mental health sciences yield become increasingly unrelated and detached from the 
patient experience, and in turn these sciences are then faced with an even harder problem 
of lacking tools to reliably and accurately sample patients with shared phenomenology; the 
very sampling cohesiveness that is necessary for genuine research development and progress. 
What is needed, Fuchs argues, is a precise and accurate framework that can “integrate single 
symptoms and neuropsychological dysfunction into a coherent whole of altered conscious 
experience.” (Fuchs, 2010, p. 269) 
In light of this consistent call for more patient phenomenology in psychiatric classification, 
we might ask why a systematic patient phenomenology remains somewhat peripheral in 
both research and clinical practices? One possible answer could be that this lack simply 
illustrates the underlying impossibility of developing a ready-made, systematic framework of 
patient phenomenology (e.g. Häfner, 2015; Ramos-Gorostize & Adán-Manes, 2013). Another 
answer could be that what has impeded the inclusion of patient phenomenology is not so 
much its practical and theoretical challenges, but instead the relative shortage of actual 
systematic standardisation and implementation efforts. Indeed, while there have been 
notable developments of such frameworks (e.g. Giorgi, Giorgi & Morley, 2017; Nordgaard, 
Sass & Parnas, 2013; Parnas et al., 2005; Stanghellini, 2016; Stanghellini, Castellini, Faravelli 
& Ricca, 2012) these remain relatively peripheral contributions in mental health research 
and practice. If what is needed is a larger collaborative effort towards research and practical 
implementation, providing an overarching structured, standardised semantics for patient 
phenomenology would seem to be a step in the right direction. 
In this contribution, we aim to initiate a standardised formalisation of central entities and 
relationships in patient phenomenology, applicable across the sciences and disciplines in 
mental health research and practice. We approach this standardisation effort with the method 
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of applied ontology, drawing on existing open-source resources from the Open Biomedical 
Ontologies (OBO) Foundry (Smith et al., 2007), such as the Mental Functioning Ontology 
(Hastings et al., 2012). 
In this section, we outline some general aspects of applied ontology, the method we propose 
for developing a standard for the semantics of patient phenomenology. To motivate the use 
of applied ontologies as a suitable method for a standardisation of patient phenomenology, 
we will remark on some of the interdisciplinary complexities and challenges facing the field 
of mental health research and practice; features that, in our opinion, make applied ontologies 
particularly appealing.
Mental health research and practice is a thoroughly interdisciplinary field. What this essentially 
means is that clearly demarcated scientific objectives such as mapping etiological processes 
or developing patient care programs will not necessarily rest on correspondingly clearly 
demarcated scientific disciplines. For example, uncovering the etiology of mental diseases is not 
a task exclusive to neurobiology, but involves insights from many other sciences, e.g. genetics, 
endocrinology, immunology, molecular biology, psychology, etc. Likewise, developing 
treatment strategies is not a task exclusively reserved for psychiatry, but must eventually be 
informed by the relevant aforementioned natural and behavioural sciences. 
As a result of this interdisciplinarity, a shared semantics (e.g. diagnostic vocabularies) and 
general scientific consensus across the disciplines is needed in order for these researchers 
to work practically and efficiently together, insofar as these collaborations entail facilitating 
intercommunication and integration of research efforts. Many such standardisation efforts 
already exist, for example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 
which aims at delineating discrete classes of psychiatric signs and symptoms. The core 
strength of the DSM-5 is that it makes it possible for two (or more) researchers from different 
disciplines to communicate clearly about instances of, say, Major Depressive Disorder, given 
its defined signs and symptoms in the DSM-5. Thus, when empirical testing is carried out on 
patient samples with this diagnosis, researchers from different disciplines can then be certain 
(to the degree the DSM-5 is clinically reliable) that they are, as a minimum, testing people 
with the same type of signs and symptoms; and research results can therefore be meaningfully 
aggregated and analysed. 
However, much of the existing interdisciplinary standardisation and consensus in the field is 
both imperfect and contested (e.g. Sullivan, 2017), causing real practical problems for research 
communication and integration (e.g. Bluhm, 2017). Indeed, in the absence of a scientific 
consensus, fundamental hurdles for scientific progress necessarily occur. For example, if 
one discipline understands the term “disorder” as an evolutionarily defined abnormality in 
organic tissue, and another discipline understands “disorder” as a type of clinical diagnosis, 
the effective result is a creation of potential misunderstandings when these two disciplines 
are working together. When enough of these non-shared, discipline specific idiosyncrasies 
are manifest in a specific subject-matter, it will eventually impede interdisciplinary efforts in 
various ways.
The problem of non-shared, non-standardised semantics might seem trivial and solvable 
insofar as one could suggest that researchers simply need to be more mindful about the 
uniqueness of their professional lingo when communicating outside their traditionally 
defined disciplinary boundaries. Such a response, however, drastically underestimates the 
real practical scope of the problem. The more developed and detailed individual scientific 
disciplines become, the more large-scale and heterogeneous the resulting scientific data 
output also becomes. In light of this expansion, the problem of navigating the complexity 
within and across disciplinary boundaries becomes not so much a challenge for scientists to 
2. Background: 
Applied 
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be mindful about, as it becomes a challenge practically impossible for any one single human 
researcher to solve (e.g. Poldrack et al., 2017). 
In many research domains today (e.g. brain anatomy), the quantity and complexity of the 
data output is increasing with exponential pace, and researchers must now implement and 
base their research efforts on an extensive and fundamental use of computational software 
(e.g. Gorgolewski et al., 2016). So, where researchers used to share and integrate knowledge 
through traditional communicative means such as research publications, contemporary 
research is becoming digitalized, transforming some aspects of scientific conversations into 
algorithmically driven operations on large data models. For example, in order to fully account 
for the basic processes in the central nervous system involved in, say, emotion processing, a 
computational model must be built that can include and integrate data from neurobiology, 
endocrinology, behavioural sciences, and so forth.This digitalization of contemporary research 
necessitates standardisation, as in order for data to be properly handled by computational 
processes, data must be annotated with consistent, pre-established semantics. And it is exactly 
in this process that semantic inconsistencies potentially migrate into scientific efforts with 
ensuing negative effects. Certainly, where two conversing individuals may be able to notice 
and correct misunderstandings, for instance, that they each meant slightly different things 
when they used the term “disorder”, this type of ad-hoc semantic flexibility is simply not 
tenable when using computational processes. 
Consider, for instance, two independent groups of researchers studying the same phenomenon 
A in a population sample. The first group of researchers decides to digitally label this 
phenomenon as “anxiety” and the other group of researchers annotate the same phenomenon 
A with the label “fear” (i.e. two different terms/labels for the same phenomenon). These two 
research projects would then, according to the underlying algorithm, be dealing with two 
different phenomena. Consider now thousands of researchers across hundreds of research 
groups dealing with datasets consisting of millions of labels and trillions of data points, with 
similar uniqueness in their annotation scheme as just described. In such a case, automatic 
integration and aggregation of data output (across research efforts) will then either be 
impossible (due to idiosyncrasies creating algorithmic errors) or, at best, require an extremely 
laborious post-hoc gerrymandering of individual datasets (e.g. manually detecting where 
datasets factually overlap, but are annotated with differing labels, a process often referred to 
as harmonisation [Spjuth et al., 2015]).
These are some of the fundamental problems that mental health research and practice is 
facing. One ideal way to get around this problem is for all researchers to operate with a shared 
semantics, agreeing on what differentiates one label from another (e.g. what makes “fear” 
different from “anxiety”). In such a scenario, the datasets will be straightforward to integrate. 
Scientists are recently becoming more conscious of this data integration problem, which 
has led to large scale initiatives aiming to create standardised semantics beyond the DSM-5 
classifications. For example, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) project is largely motivated by such standardisation objectives (e.g. Insel et al., 
2010). Through its many funding opportunities, the NIMH directly encourages (and to some 
extent requires) research efforts to be structured according to predefined semantic definitions 
from this framework, the goal being that interdisciplinary research becomes more integrated, 
and therefore may yield a more detailed understanding of psychopathology, with expected 
positive outcomes for treatment development (e.g. Clark et al., 2017). 
It is within this interdisciplinary landscape that applied ontologies offer a promising approach 
to improving research procedures. Applied ontologies are computational tools for the 
organisation, structuring, and standardisation of terminologies for data annotation, used in a 
broad range of different fields for both research and practical purposes (Hastings, 2017; Munn 
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& Smith, 2008; Arp, Smith & Spear, 2015). In essence, applied ontologies are computational 
structures which formally capture the definitions and meaning of terminology used in a given 
field, including logical relationships between terms. In turn, this formalisation makes applied 
ontologies powerful tools for use in diverse applications, from end user software (e.g. clinical 
information systems) to data aggregation (e.g. shareable data repositories) to applicable 
research purposes (e.g. data mining algorithms for research and precision medicine) (see 
also Haendel, Chute and Robinson, 2018). Applied ontologies are already widely implemented 
across sciences that face some of the same (interdisciplinary) complexities we find in mental 
health research and practice (biology being the most prominent example, e.g. Ashburner et al., 
2000), making the method a de facto sound point of departure.
Each applied ontology serves a particular semantic scope or domain, and has an integrative 
purpose. Thus, it is developed not so much with reference to specific theories (say, of what 
mental disease is), but, to the greatest extent possible, as an a-theoretical consensus taxonomy 
of clearly defined entities and their relationships (Figure 1). At the heart of efficient and 
applicable ontology development is the aim of enabling different scientific disciplines to 
harvest the benefits of ontologized, semantic standardisation regardless of what theory 
individual researchers subscribe to, by following careful methodological principles (e.g. Smith 
& Ceusters 2010). Applied ontologies are developed with the goal to delineate and define all 
relevant entities and their relations within a specific domain. Content is structured both 
hierarchically and through the use of formal relationships.
Figure 1. A generic example of the taxonomic structure of an ontology. The ontology captures 
entity definitions and relations in a hierarchical structure underpinned by a logical language. 
Many different semantic relationships may be used to define and interconnect entities, and 
domain-specific ontologies exist for different domains, yet are unified through alignment with 
common upper level ontologies. Ontologies serve as hubs for data annotations.
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The structure of applied ontologies offers multiple advantages. For example, entities are 
arranged hierarchically such that, logically, everything that is true about an upper-level 
entity is also true about a classified lower level entity (e.g. A vs. B in Figure 1). Furthermore, 
what distinguishes the lower-level entity from the immediate upper-level (e.g. what makes B 
different from A in Figure 1) is also formulated in logical terms: B is an A that Cs. This logical 
structure enables algorithms to make efficient automated inferences across large-scale 
datasets. Ontologies also include other logical relationships between entities, as indicated by 
the blue arrow (i.e. has_part) in Figure 1, allowing for additional inferences within and between 
ontologies (e.g. Larsen & Hastings, 2018).
One relevant benefit of how ontologies make relationships between entities explicit in and 
across domains, is that it allows for mapping together different scientific levels or granularities 
(Bittner & Smith, 2003). For example, an ontology of neurobiological entities can be mapped 
explicitly onto entities in an ontology concerning subjectively experienced emotion processes; 
or a gene ontology may map entities (e.g. gene products) onto specific entities in a mental 
disease ontology (e.g. specific symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease). This is appealing because 
the method is interdisciplinary by design, allowing for sufficiently complex interconnections 
of the subject-matter within an entirely dynamic framework; one of the central qualities 
lacking in current data structuring methods (i.e. a criticism that has been directed at the 
aforementioned RDoC project, e.g. Ceusters, Jensen & Diehl, 2017; Larsen & Hastings, 2018; 
Lilienfeld, 2014; Lilienfeld & Treadway, 2016; Parnas, 2014).
These integration efforts are especially eased when ontologies are developed in accordance 
with a shared so-called upper-level formal ontology, for instance, such as the open-source Basic 
Formal Ontology (BFO) (Arp, Smith & Spear, 2015). An upper-level formal ontology is essentially 
a metaphysical framework, which, when used for building applied ontologies, streamlines or 
categorises the subject-matter of a domain onto this basic metaphysical structure. For example, 
the BFO explicitly distinguishes between continuants and processes, and when an applied ontology 
is developed, say, of mental health entities, we can then speak of etiology as a process and the 
presence of a disease in the organism as a continuant (for a review of the metaphysical backbone 
of BFO, see Smith & Ceusters, 2010).
Developing applied ontologies under a basic metaphysical structure may seem to contradict the 
earlier claim about ontologies being a-theoretical. Of course, a metaphysical description of the 
world is indisputably a theory about the world. However, by referring to ontologies as a-theoretical 
we are emphasising the way ontologies aim at describing all relevant entities in a domain, and by 
doing so, try to avoid making such a description theoretically dependent. That is, ontologies aim to 
account for entities in a domain, in a way that is independent of the truth value of any one theory 
(e.g. Hennig, 2008; Smith, 2008). To give an example of this, the Emotion Ontology (Hastings, Ceusters, 
Smith & Mulligan, 2011) aims to describe all the entities relevant for human emotional phenomena, 
e.g. motor behaviour, physiological signs, subjective feelings, etc., entities which researchers in the 
field would be generating data about, regardless of whether they adhere to cognitive or non-cognitive 
theories of emotion. To the extent that data are able to be integrated through ontological mapping 
regardless of which theoretical paradigm they arise from, the more it becomes possible to amass 
empirical evidence towards the broader objective of determining which theory is the most valid. 
Obviously, though, as soon as researchers start describing entities, they have already taken a 
metaphysical standpoint, whether they explicitly reveal this or not (this is trivially true since the 
mere claim that entities exist is a metaphysical standpoint). But the upside of building applied 
ontologies on upper-level formal ontologies is that the (unavoidable) metaphysical framework is 
explicitly disclosed, and therefore, may also be revised through a common peer-review process. 
For example, the BFO was launched in 2004 (Grenon, Smith & Goldberg, 2004), and has been 
revised in a community process culminating in the release of BFO 2.0 in 2012 (Arp, Smith & 
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Spear, 2015). By bringing this process out in the open, so to speak, we not only ensure that the 
underlying metaphysical backbone is being debated, we may also hypothesize that scientists in 
general will become more mindful about their underlying metaphysical commitments. 
Aside from these positive side effects, it should be emphasized that the general incentive 
behind using upper-level ontologies is that if one domain has already been sufficiently 
described with the use of such a framework, this will then allow similarly structured 
ontologies to import relevant content where domains overlap, reducing the duplication of 
effort, and more importantly, allowing one domain to harvest the work already carried out in 
another. An example of such a network of collaborating ontologies (grounded in BFO) can be 
found in the OBO Foundry platform (Smith et al., 2007), which currently includes more than 
250 different domain-specific applied ontologies. 
With respect to the present contribution, we suggest that a standardisation effort of patient 
phenomenology would benefit from connecting with already pre-existing efforts in the OBO 
community. Though the complete development of an ontology of patient phenomenology 
eventually can and ideally must draw on several OBO contributions, we can at this initial stage 
of the project point to the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF)1 as among the most relevant 
pre-existing ontologies (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Excerpts from BFO and the MF. Black arrows indicate an is_a relationship. White 
boxes indicate entities from the upper-level BFO (shared with many ontology efforts), while 
orange boxes indicate entities from the MF.
1  The MF ontology can be downloaded in full from https://github.com/jannahastings/mental-functioning-
ontology/, and is available for searching and browsing via ontology library interfaces such as the Ontology Lookup 
Service at https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ols/. 
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The MF is developed specifically for the domain of subjective mental functioning (Hastings et 
al., 2012). It includes, for example, entities such as consciousness, perception, thinking, and 
believing, emphasizing primarily the first-person or experiential perspective of human mental 
functioning. However, many of the phenomenological entities that are typically perturbed in 
psychiatric conditions are currently not described in the MF. We will address this lack in what 
follows. 
Before we begin to address how to initiate and structure an ontology of patient 
phenomenology, we must first address what exactly is meant by patient phenomenology, and 
which aspects of this subject matter should be included in an applied ontological framework. 
The ideal way the subject matter of any ontology is delineated is through a community-
wide discourse, but since this type of conversation (to our knowledge) has not yet taken 
place within the context of the development of an ontology (or similar semantic structure) 
for this domain, we can here only suggest a tentative outline, which we hope will be seen 
as an invitation to instantiate a more organized collaborative effort through, for example, 
workshops and conferences, as well as published proceedings and special issues in relevant 
academic journals. 
The use of the phrase “patient phenomenology” refers to using the method of phenomenology 
when accounting for mental health phenomena. Phenomenology is a philosophical method 
developed by Edmund Husserl in the early 20th century (Zahavi, 2003), and refined and 
expanded by Husserl’s students and followers such as Martin Heidegger, Edith Stein, Max 
Scheler, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and others (e.g. Zahavi, 2012; 2018a). Phenomenology 
as a method has a longstanding tradition of psychiatric application, i.e. phenomenological 
psychopathology or phenomenological psychiatry, which grew out of the expansion of early 
Husserlian phenomenology to include more qualitative aspects of perception and lived 
experience (e.g. Jaspers, 1913; Minkowski, 1970). Analogous to the use of phenomenology 
in philosophy and cognitive sciences as a method for mapping the formal structures of 
consciousness (e.g. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012), the application of phenomenology in psychiatry 
aims at describing and accounting for both the basic structural and qualitative introspective 
aspects of the patient’s first-person experience with regards to mental health or clinical 
phenomena (e.g. Fuchs & Pallagrosi, 2018; Parnas, Sass & Zahavi, 2013; Stanghellini et al., 2018; 
Zahavi, 2018b). 
Phenomenology is appealing as a psychiatric method due to its overarching framework of both 
providing a formal representation of how consciousness universally or canonically operates, 
and a detailed qualitative analysis of how human beings relate to the content of consciousness 
(e.g. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). The framework of phenomenology attempts to give a universal 
picture of how human beings formally process their sense-impressions into meaningful 
perceptions (i.e. structures of consciousness), and how these perceptions are qualitatively 
experienced (i.e. what it is like to have such perceptions). This overall framework, then, allows 
psychiatrists to perform many different analyses, of which we can highlight two with obvious 
psychiatric utility: 
First, it makes it possible to form intelligible hypotheses about whether a specific 
phenomenon is psychiatrically abnormal. For example, if the way a person is processing 
their perceptions deviates from what phenomenologists believe to be universally true about 
human consciousness, we might then hypothesize that this is due to a pathology. Consider 
if a person is experiencing problems with retracting episodes from short-term memory, 
phenomenologists may then posit that this is abnormal insofar as short-term memory plays a 
central and reliable (i.e. canonical) role in the way humans experience and perceive the world 
(e.g. Bortolotti, 2010; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Matthews, 2006). 
3. Patient 
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Secondly, the phenomenological framework makes it possible to formalise a significantly more 
detailed understanding of the qualitative aspect of a patient’s suffering by meticulously mapping 
and paying attention to the entirety of a specific mental health issue. For example, if a person 
has experienced a specific traumatizing episode that seems to be the root cause of a prolonged 
mental disability, phenomenologists will then take into consideration a network of different 
qualitative aspects such as: how was the trauma experienced as opposed or in addition to what 
caused the trauma; has the trauma affected the patient’s self-awareness as opposed or in addition 
to merely mapping superficial symptoms; and so on. Because a phenomenologist understands 
consciousness as a vast network - as opposed to mere rationality - the phenomenological analysis 
of the qualitative aspect is therefore also described in similar network-like detail (e.g. Parnas, 
Sass & Zahavi, 2013; Rosfort & Stanghellini, 2014; Stanghellini & Rossi, 2014). 
It is apparent that phenomenological psychopathology can be contrasted with two widely 
accepted paradigms in traditional descriptive psychiatry: the first paradigm being the 
clinician’s external perspective on patient behaviour and experience (i.e. how the clinician 
diagnostically classifies the patient), and the second paradigm being how a scientific discipline 
is measuring physiological processes related to the pathology (e.g. how a neurobiologist would 
search for neurofunctional and/or neurostructural patterns underpinning specific diagnosis) 
(e.g. Fuchs & Pallagrosi, 2018; Wiggins & Schwartz, 2011). In contrast to these two paradigms, 
patient phenomenology aims at doing justice to, and describing in greater detail the first-
person level of subjective experiences. 
As mentioned, phenomenological approaches are typically under-emphasised in 
contemporary research and practice (e.g. Parnas, 2014), yet they hold the promise to reveal 
novel insights into the shared and distinguishing features of psychiatric conditions (e.g. 
Messas, Fulford & Stanghellini 2017). What a thorough patient phenomenology aspires 
to accomplish is multifaceted and complex, and we do not have the space to review this 
in full in the present contribution (but see, e.g. Fernandez, 2018; Giorgi, Giorgi & Morley, 
2017; Parnas & Zahavi, 2002). However, Fuchs (2010) gives us some central pointers. He sees 
patient phenomenology as a cornerstone in achieving a long-standing, general aspiration in 
mental health research, the goal of creating a complex model of “psychopathology capable of 
mediating between symptom level and process level, and of developing models of the inherent 
structure and possible disturbances of conscious experience.” (Fuchs, 2010, p. 269) In other 
words, by representing the complexity of first-person experiences, phenomenologists (such as 
Fuchs) hypothesize that more robust patterns in symptomatology will emerge, which in turn 
will inform and guide research and treatment efforts (for similar views, see Gallagher, 2003; 
Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Stanghellini & Rossi, 2014).
So, how do we achieve this ambitious goal set forth by phenomenologists? In our opinion, 
one foundational aspect that is needed is a semantic framework that makes it possible to 
sufficiently describe the main subject matter of phenomenology, namely: (1) the universal 
basic structures of how human consciousness functions, and (2) the content, or the whatness 
of lived, introspective experience. On a more practical or operational note, the objective is to 
provide a logically coherent, uniform, shared language - an applied ontology - for developing 
data annotation frameworks to capture psychiatric phenomenology, which in turn can 
form a basis for psychiatric assessment tools and patient tracking systems. Ideally, once a 
patient enters the clinic or a research facility, a mental health clinician can, with the use of 
purposely developed phenomenological interviewing methods and assessment tools (e.g. 
Høffding & Martiny, 2015; Parnas et al., 2005) describe in detail the patient’s lived experience 
for diagnostic and research purposes. And as long as these tools are developed using the same 
set of ontologized semantics (i.e. the same underlying applied ontology), data aggregation and 
analysis will be substantially eased compared to current practices.
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By developing and making available such an applied ontology, phenomenologists will thereby 
be constructing the open-source backbone for the development of tools and resources 
that make it possible for practitioners and researchers to capture data about patient 
symptomatology in uniform ways, a prerequisite for contemporary interdisciplinary science 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3. The process from patient interviewing to big data sharing and research initiatives. 
When data is collected using tools build on a shared applied ontology, data aggregation and 
analysis is substantially eased.
Standardising the domain of patient phenomenology will play a key role in weaving together 
the clinical subject matter and the research processes in order to further our understanding 
of mental health and developing new treatment strategies. For various reasons, none of the 
phenomenologically oriented data-structuring standards developed thus far (e.g. Parnas et 
al., 2005) have been developed to the extent that they are able to sufficiently describe the 
various patient phenomena we encounter in the clinic, as often these approaches have been 
preliminary in nature, or explicitly developed for one type of disorder. Unlike existing tools, 
applied ontology offers a flexible and adaptable approach to standardisation that is well suited 
to capture the subject matter. In what follows, we offer a first step towards capturing such a 
standard, and discuss how this relates to other types of standards in psychiatry.
In this section, we aim to give a brief, tentative sketch of some ontological entities and 
their relations for the domain of patient phenomenology. When building an applied 
ontology, a number of practical steps are necessary (e.g. Arp, Smith, & Spear, 2015). One 
crucial aspect is that the entities (i.e. terms and relationships) included in the ontology 
must ultimately be selected and defined by domain experts, ideally in the context of a 
community-wide conversation. In the domain of patient phenomenology, these experts are 
philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists with theoretical and practical knowledge about 
phenomenology. The reliance on domain experts is to ensure that the selected entities make 
up the best representation of the current (peer-reviewed) knowledge. What follows in this 
section is therefore only a tentative first-step in this process. 
Our approach towards initiating this process was to survey the literature on applied 
patient phenomenology in an effort to identify existing attempts to standardise patient 
phenomenology. We worked from the assumption that the standardisation efforts we located 
reflected proper patient phenomenology entities, which we then categorised in the context 
of the broader grouping of mental functioning entities in the MF. Through this approach we 
4. Ontology 
of Patient 
Phenomenology: 
A Tentative 
Prototype
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intend to demonstrate two things: First, how the semantics of patient phenomenology can be 
ontologically structured, and second, how existing tools (and existing practices surrounding 
these tools) in phenomenological psychiatry can be harnessed to achieve the aim of building 
an ontology of patient phenomenology. 
Messas and colleagues (2018) provide an overview of some of the basic entities of lived, 
first-person experience typically included in a phenomenological framework, namely, the 
experience of lived time, lived space, lived body, intersubjectivity and the sense of selfhood (Messas 
et al., 2018, p. 2). In a phenomenological psychiatric framework, these entities refer to basic 
structures of first-person experience, which are easily overlooked when they are functioning 
normally, but are related to the most obvious, profound psychiatric disturbances when 
they malfunction. For example, we may understand our sense of having selfhood, that is, a 
specific core identity, as a trivial fact of our lived experience. But in some psychopathological 
instances, it can be this very notion of experienced selfhood that is abnormal, for instance, the 
feeling of disintegrated identity (e.g. Parnas et al., 2005). 
According to the MF, all mental processes give rise to cognitive representations, that is, they 
are intentional. In the MF, consciousness is an inseparable part of mental processes (Hastings 
et al., 2012), and it is consciousness that confers intentionality. However, mental processes 
include further structural parts, which are not separable but are nevertheless distinguishable 
from the conscious (or representational) content of a mental process, capturing the ways that 
the representational content is presented, shaped or organised to its bearer. Table 1 lists 
relevant entities from the MF ontology which form the basis for our annotation of entities of 
relevance for a phenomenological framework.
Entity Parent Definition ID
mental 
disposition
bodily 
disposition
A bodily disposition that is realized in a mental 
process.
MF:0000033
mental process bodily 
process
A bodily process that is of a type such that it can of 
itself be conscious.
MF:0000020
mental quality bodily 
quality
A bodily quality that inheres in those structures of 
the extended organism that are essential for mental 
functioning.
MF:0000075
intentionality mental 
quality
The fundamental quality of conscious mental 
processes of always having content (i.e. mental 
processes are always directed towards, or about 
something).
MF:0000073
consciousness mental 
process 
part
Consciousness is an inseparable part of all mental 
processes. It is that part of the mental process that: a) 
confers a subjective perspective, a phenomenology, an 
experience of the mental process of which it is a part; 
and b) intends the object or event that the mental 
process is about, should such exist; i.e., it confers 
intentionality on the mental process.
MF:0000017
Table 1: Entities in the MF ontology of relevance for phenomenology. Column descriptions: 
“Entity” includes the ontology entity label; “Parent” the ontology entity’s semantic parent 
relation; “Definition” is the definition of the entity as it is included in the ontology; “ID” is the 
unique identifier for the entity.
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We then included the entities from Messas et al. (2018) in the MF as further structural parts 
of mental processes. For example, we added the entity Time Awareness to MF, defined as “The 
subjective experience of time as a coherent process inhabited by oneself as an embodied thinking 
being.” Another example is Body Awareness, which is defined as “The subjective experience of 
being an embodied entity”. Furthermore, each entity is classified beneath its respective parent 
entity. For example, Time Awareness is a subtype of Higher Order Consciousness, which is defined as 
“consciousness of one’s own mental states, a self-reflexive consciousness of the experience of 
being conscious, of having mental processes ongoing”. Table 2 (below) lists examples of entities 
that have been added to the MF to represent the structural aspects of conscious mental processes. 
Entity Parent Definition ID
time awareness higher order 
consciousness
The subjective experience of time as a coherent 
process inhabited by oneself as an embodied 
thinking being
MF:0000072
space awareness higher order 
consciousness
The subjective experience of the spacial 
surroundings one inhabits as an embodied entity.
MF:0000077
body awareness higher order 
consciousness
The subjective experience of being an embodied 
entity.
MF:0000078
inter-
subjectivity
higher order 
consciousness
The subjective experience of other beings as self-
aware entities.
MF:0000079
consciousness 
of self 
(selfhood)
consciousness The subjective experience of having a time 
persistent personal identity.
MF:0000067
Table 2: New entities added to the MF. Column descriptions: “Entity” includes the ontology 
entity label; “Parent” the ontology entity’s parent entity; “Definition” is the definition of the 
ontology entity; “ID” is the unique identifier for the entity.
These basic structures of phenomenology have been added to the MF ontology, as opposed 
to including them in a separate ontology of patient phenomenology, since they are parts 
of ordinary mental functioning and are thus within MF scope. On the other hand, for those 
aspects of patient phenomenology that concern disturbances of MF entities (i.e. disturbances 
of mental functioning), we suggest the creation of an Ontology of Patient Phenomenology 
separate to the MF, but semantically and logically connected to it. 
To identify examples of such entities (i.e. disturbances of mental functioning entities), 
we surveyed the literature and found a number of existing efforts in applied patient 
phenomenology. Two clinical tools were of obvious relevance: The Examination of Anomalous 
Self-Experience (EASE) scale, and the Identity and Eating Disorders (IDEA) self-report measure. 
Both are clinical assessment tools developed by phenomenological psychiatrists and 
philosophers for the standardised capture of psychiatric phenomena. The EASE aims to assess 
disturbances of self-experience (Parnas et al., 2005), and the IDEA targets experiences related 
to embodiment and how this shapes personal identity (Stanghellini et al., 2012). The items from 
the EASE scale are listed in Appendix A, and items from the IDEA scale are listed in Appendix B. 
We used the items from the EASE and IDEA scales to derive initial examples of entities to be 
included in the Ontology of Patient Phenomenology. 
For example, the entity Thought Block (EASE scale entity 1.4) can be defined as “the subjective 
experience of a sudden blocking of, or inability to feed with new thoughts, the stream of 
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consciousness”. In the MF we have defined the entity Stream of Consciousness as “the cognitive 
structural capacity to experience one’s thoughts as a coherent, uninterrupted process”. 
The MF and patient phenomenology entities are differentiated in a fairly straightforward 
manner: The MF entity suggests that the process of having a coherent stream of consciousness is 
a universal capacity in the human organism that should, all things considered, be functioning 
(i.e. processing) reliably. So, when a patient is undergoing an instance of Thought Block, then, 
this would be characterised as a disturbance of said MF capacity. 
Consider also semantically and logically similar examples: the entity Body Estrangement (EASE 
scale entity 3.3) could be defined as a type of disturbance of the MF-entity Bodily Awareness; 
the entity Self Awareness by Others (IDEA Factor 1) could be defined as a disturbance of the MF-
entity Self Awareness; the entity Identity Confusion (EASE scale entity 2.9) could be defined as a 
disturbance of the MF-entity Self-Awareness; and so forth. In Figure 4 (below), we illustrate how 
selected entities from BFO, MF, and the (prototype) Ontology of Patient Phenomenology may 
be linked. 
Figure 4. Illustration of entities in the prototype Ontology of Patient Phenomenology: Black 
boxes represent BFO entities, orange boxes MF entities, and purple boxes candidate entities 
from the prototype ontology of patient phenomenology. Solid arrows represent ‘is a’ relation, 
while dashed arrows represent the relation ‘disturbance of’ which links between the patient 
phenomenology entities and the corresponding MF entities. 
As emphasised earlier, the final ontological mapping and definition of these entities must be 
worked out through a community-wide participatory process, which is an ongoing effort. This 
process is being guided by the well-established standards for building ontologies with BFO 
(Arp, Smith, & Spear 2015), as well as best practices for creating ontological definitions (e.g. 
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Seppälä, Ruttenberg & Smith, 2017). Finally, the Ontology of Patient Phenomenology will be 
maintained through a transparent editorial work of community-wide contributions, which 
includes introducing new entities (i.e. terms and relationships) into the ontology when these 
have been conventionally defined, as well as carrying out modifications to already existing 
entities when these have been agreed upon (for article on how this work in practice, see 
Dessimoz & Škunca, 2017). 
In this paper we have sketched a preliminary outline of an approach to standardise the 
semantics of patient phenomenology as an applied ontology. One of the advantages of using 
an applied ontological framework, we argued, is the utility, flexibility and adaptability of 
ontologies in general, but also the existing basis in already developed ontologies (e.g. the 
MF) alongside the computational infrastructure designed for open source sharing and reuse 
of content. Alongside the formal task of developing an applied ontology, there will be a 
substantial number of issues that need to be sorted out through the usual scientific and 
philosophical discourses. In this section, we shall briefly address some foreseeable questions, 
limitations and challenges.
Data-driven researchers may see an applied ontological standard as a general blessing insofar 
as it is implementable in any psychiatric clinic and thus facilitates a potentially much more 
detailed data collection. But ontologies are not always unproblematic for practitioners. 
Standardised semantics may, if not developed in close connection with practitioners, disrupt 
operational standards that practitioners have been accustomed to using. Therefore, in 
developing an applied ontology, contributors must include interests from stakeholders across 
the professional spectrum. An ontology is only useful if it is broadly endorsed and applied. 
Implementation, with good interfaces and systems designed for ease of use with the end-user 
in mind, will be key. 
Alongside these implementation issues, there exists a suite of challenges regarding proper 
clinical use and application. The development and use of a semantic framework does not 
guarantee that data collection or assessment is reliable. For example, annotating reliably 
(and validly) that a patient is experiencing, say, Thought Block, will fall predominantly on the 
shoulders of the practitioner. It is therefore imperative that the development of an applied 
ontology is supplemented with a likewise serious effort in clinical training to maintain a high 
level of reliable data annotation. These challenges are not unique to assessing and annotating 
patient phenomenology entities, but are well-known problems in data handling in mental 
health practice and research (e.g. Lilienfeld, Smith & Watts, 2013). Indeed, just because a 
domain has been standardised (e.g. diagnostics in the DSM-5) it does not follow that its entities 
are also appropriately applied. Challenges pertaining to clinical reliability will call for further 
standardization in patient interviewing and reporting practices, for which the EASE and IDEA 
scales provides a relevant starting point (see also, Høffding & Martiny, 2016; Stanghellini, 
2016). 
Relatedly, advocates of patient phenomenology can at times be read as if they suggest that 
first-person perspectives must substitute or replace the third-person perspectives that dominate 
the existing clinical standards (e.g. the DSM-5, RDoC, etc.). However, this view is inherently 
problematic. Psychiatric patients may, for various reasons, not always be the best interpreters 
of their own situation, and known disconnects may arise between patient self-reports of 
experience and clinician’s observations of the same phenomena. For example, a person 
suffering from bipolar disorder may have episodes where, from their own perspective, they 
are experiencing an uncanny calmness and lucidity, while a clinician may observe that they 
are outwardly acting as if they are undergoing a manic episode. Ceusters and Smith (2010) 
highlight the need to annotate and be mindful of these different levels of description, namely, 
5. Discussion and 
Conclusion
215
MAPPING THE PATIENT’S EXPERIENCE
the patient’s own experience (e.g. lucidity), the clinician’s assessment (e.g. manic episode), and 
the relation between these two data points. In contrast to existing diagnostic systems, applied 
ontologies can provide the methodological framework to enable the annotation of such a 
complex (multi-level) phenomenon. 
As mentioned, existing clinical standards (e.g. DSM-5, RDoC, etc.) already include some 
(though few) references to patient phenomenology. One advantage of an ontology of patient 
phenomenology is that it can be used to draw logical relationships between already existing 
clinical standards, e.g. between entities in the EASE and the DSM-5 category of schizophrenia 
(see also, Larsen & Hastings, 2018). This integrative ability has a number of advantages, of 
which we may highlight two: 
First, often when a new standard is introduced, it will typically mean that former, older 
standards must be disregarded in favour of the new one. This naturally leads to inconsistencies 
and discrepancies in the field as not all researchers and practitioners will favour the new 
standard and decide to stick to former practices. However, by introducing a new standard in 
form of an applied ontology, this allows for the incorporation of the existing data sets that 
are based on former standards, by simply semantically bridging, or creating cross-references 
between, these data points/sets into the new standard. The fact that applied ontologies have 
this flexibility seems to be an especially strong aspect allowing for synthesising and building 
on already existing research efforts, as opposed to “starting from scratch”, so to speak. 
Second, the integrative ability of applied ontologies may ease the clinical implementation 
effort insofar as when introducing new standards there will not only be straightforward 
overlapping elements, but practitioners will be able to utilize pre-existing tools as long as 
they please due to their semantic bridging into the new standard. While some practitioners 
might find the new standard more appealing and intuitive, other practitioners might disagree. 
With an applied ontological framework, the explicit use of a new standard is not mandatory; 
moreover, what is essential is that earlier standards are - below the surface - semantically 
connected, something that an applied ontological framework is developed to facilitate. 
It should be re-emphasized that one of the central challenges will be to practically implement 
the new semantics so it is used by both practitioners and researchers in mental health in 
a joint effort to collect and share large-scale, quality data through data repositories. As 
mentioned, an applied ontology is only useful if it is actually used for what it is designed to 
do (i.e. taxonomizing domain-specific data into a logical and relational structure). If only 
researchers, and not practitioners, decide to use these standards; or even worse, if only some 
individuals from different groups choose to do so, an applied ontology is bound to generate 
just as much confusion as it offers to clarify. One way to ease and facilitate the implementation 
of an applied ontology is to keep it as an open-source resource, which software developers 
can then use when creating patient data, tracking and record systems for practitioners, or 
automated data annotation programs for various disciplines (e.g. neurobiology, genetics, etc.). 
For example, when a neurobiology research group conducts an experiment on patients with, 
say, Major Depression Disorder (from the DSM-5), software can then be developed that utilizes 
the Ontology of Patient Phenomenology allowing for a much more detailed capturing of the 
patient’s symptoms. That is, instead of tracking neurological functioning (e.g. fMRI) in people 
with five or more of the nine third-person described symptoms in the DSM-5 classification (or 
any other similar scale), research software built on the Ontology of Patient Phenomenology 
will then allow for a much more detailed account of the patient that is performing or 
undergoing the neurofunctional testing; which in turn is a much more detailed representation 
of the phenomenon, making it possible to execute much more profound statistical analysis of 
symptom patterns (see also Gallagher, 2003; Stanghellini & Rossi, 2014). 
Lastly, and as mentioned earlier, the phenomenology community will play a crucial role in 
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developing the first full version of the Ontology of Patient Phenomenology. Mirroring the 
complexity of mental health research, patient phenomenology is too complex for any one 
researcher to fully and sufficiently map, and quality is therefore dependent on community-
wide participation. Moreover, an operational version will, due to this complexity, always be 
viewed as an adequatist product, aiming for a pragmatic solution to the task of representing 
patient phenomenology. Importantly, an ontology is in this sense never complete, but must 
undergo constant revisions based on appropriate community feedback. In this contribution, 
we discussed the moderate goal of initiating the building of an applied ontology, which we aim 
to follow up by facilitating extensive community-wide participation through workshops and 
conferences. 
REFERENCES
Arp R., Smith B. & Spear A. D. (2015). Building ontologies with basic formal ontology. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press;
Ashburner M., Ball C. A., Blake J. A., Botstein D., Butler H., Cherry J. M., … Sherlock G. (2000). 
Gene ontology: Tool for the unification of biology. The Gene Ontology Consortium. Nature 
Genetics, 25(1), pp. 25-29; 
Bittner T., & Smith B. (2003). A theory of granular partitions. In M. Duckham M. F. Goodchild & 
M. F. Worboys (eds.), Foundations of geographic information science (pp.117-151). London: Taylor & 
Francis;
Bluhm R. (2017). The need for new ontologies in psychiatry. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 
pp. 146-159;
Borrell-Carrió F., Suchman A. L. & Epstein R. M. (2004). The biopsychosocial model 25 years 
later: Principles, practice, and scientific inquiry. Annals of family medicine, 2(6), pp. 576-582;
Bortolotti L. (2010). Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
Ceusters W., Jensen M. & Diehl A. D. (2017). Ontological realism for the Research Domain 
Criteria for mental disorders. Studies in Health and Technology Informatics, 235, pp. 431-435;
Clark L. A., Cuthbert B., Lewis-Fernández R., Narrow W. E. & Reed G. M. (2017). Three 
approaches to understanding and classifying mental disorder: ICD-11, DSM-5, and the National 
Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC). Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 18(2), pp. 72-145;
Cuthbert B. N. & Insel T. R. (2013). Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: The seven pillars 
of RDoC. BMC Medicine, 11(1), pp. 126-126; 
Ceusters W. and Smith B. (2010). Foundations for a realist ontology of mental disease. Journal of 
Biomedical Semantics, 1(1):10;
Dessimoz, Christophe & Škunca, Nives (Eds.). (2017). The Gene Ontology handbook. New York: 
Humana Press;
Engel G. L. (1977). The need for a new medical model: A challenge for biomedicine. Science, 
196(4286), pp. 129-136;
Fernandez A. V. (2018). Phenomenological approaches to psychiatric classification. In G. 
Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. V. Fernandez, P. Fusar-Poli, A. Raballo & R. Rosfort (Eds.), The 
Oxford handbook of phenomenological psychopathology. New York: Oxford University Press;
Frances A. (2014). RDoC is necessary, but very oversold. World psychiatry: Official journal of the 
World Psychiatric Association (WPA), 13(1), pp. 47-49;
Fuchs T. (2010). Subjectivity and intersubjectivity in psychiatric diagnosis. Psychopathology, 
43(4), pp. 268-274;
Fuchs T. & Pallagrosi M. (2018). Phenomenology of Temporality and Dimensional 
Psychopathology. In M. Biondi, M. Pasquini & A. Picardi (Eds.), Dimensional Psychopathology 
(pp. 287-300). Cham: Springer International Publishing;
217
MAPPING THE PATIENT’S EXPERIENCE
Gallagher S. (2003). Phenomenology and Experimental Design: Toward a Phenomenologically 
Enlightened Experimental Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), pp. 85-99;
Gallagher S. & Zahavi D. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 
and Cognitive Science (2 ed.). New York: Routledge;
Giorgi A., Giorgi B. & Morley J. (2017). The descriptive phenomenological psychological 
method. In C. Willig & W. Rogers (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology 
(pp. 176-192). London: SAGE Publications;
Gorgolewski K. J., Auer T., Calhoun V. D., Craddock R. C., Das S., Duff E. P., … Poldrack R. A. 
(2016). The brain imaging data structure, a format for organizing and describing outputs of 
neuroimaging experiments. Scientific Data, 3, 160044;
Grenon P., Smith B. & Goldberg L. (2004). Biodynamic ontology: Applying BFO in the biomedical 
domain. Studies in Health and Technology Informatics, 102, pp. 20–38;
Haendel M., Chute C. & Robinson P. (2018). Classification, ontology and precision medicine. 
New England Journal of Medicine, 379, pp. 1452-1462; 
Häfner H. (2015). Descriptive psychopathology, phenomenology, and the legacy of Karl Jaspers. 
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 17(1), pp. 19-29;
Hastings J. (2017). Primer on Ontologies. In C. Dessimoz & N. Škunca (Eds.), The Gene Ontology 
handbook (pp. 3-13). New York, NY: Springer New York;
Hastings J., Ceusters W., Jensen M., Mulligan K. & Smith B. (2012). Representing mental 
functioning: Ontologies for mental Health and disease. Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference on Biomedical Ontology, Graz, Austria: University of Graz, 2012;
Hastings J., Ceusters W., Smith B. & Mulligan K. (2011). Dispositions and processes in the Emotion 
Ontology. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Biomedical Ontology, volume 833 
of CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2011;
Hennig B. (2008). What is formal ontology? In K. Munn & B. Smith (Eds.), Applied ontology: An 
introduction. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag;
Høffding S. & Martiny K. (2016). Framing a phenomenological interview: What, why and how. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 15(4), pp. 539-564;
Insel T., Cuthbert B., Garvey M., Heinssen R., Pine D. S., Quinn K., … Wang P. (2010). Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC): Toward a new classification framework for research on mental 
disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry, 167(7), pp. 748-751;
Jaspers K. (1913). General psychopathology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press;
Kendell R. & Jablensky A. (2003). Distinguishing between the validity and utility of psychiatric 
diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160(1), pp. 4-12;
Larsen R. R. & Hastings J. (2018). From affective science to psychiatric disorder: Ontology as a 
semantic bridge. Frontiers in psychiatry, 9, p. 487;
Lilienfeld S. O. (2014). The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): An analysis of methodological and 
conceptual challenges. Behavior Research and Therapy, 62, pp. 129-139; 
Lilienfeld S. O. & Treadway M. (2016). Clashing diagnostic approaches: DSM-ICD Versus RDoC. 
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 12, pp. 435-463;
Lilienfeld S. O., Smith S. F. & Watts A. L. (2013). Issues in diagnosis: Conceptual issues and 
controversies. In W. E. Craighead, D. J. Miklowitz, & L. W. Craighead (Eds.), Psychopathology: 
history, diagnosis, and empirical foundation (2 ed., pp. 1-35). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons;
Lutz A. & Thompson E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: Integrating subjective experience and 
brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), 
pp. 31-52;
Kendler, Kenneth S. (2016). The nature of psychiatric disorders. World Psychiatry, 15(1), pp. 5-12. 
doi:10.1002/wps.20292;
218
RASMUS ROSENBERG LARSEN, JANNA HASTINGS
Kendler K. S., Zachar P. & Craver C. (2011). What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders? 
Psychol Med, 41(6), pp. 1143-1150;
Matthews E. (2006). Dementia and the identity of the person. In J. C. Hughes, S. J. Louw, & S. R. 
Sabat (Eds.), Dementia: Mind, meaning, and the person (pp. 163-178). New York: Oxford University 
Press;
Messas G., Fulford K. W. & Stanghellini G. (2017). The contribution of human sciences to the 
challenges of contemporary psychiatry. Trends in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 39, pp. 229-231;
Messas G., Tamelini M., Mancini M. & Stanghellini G. (2018). New perspectives in 
phenomenological Psychopathology: Its use in psychiatric treatment. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 9, 
p. 466;
Minkowski E. (1970). Lived time: Phenomenological and psychopathological studies (N. Metzel, 
Trans.). Evanston: Northwest University Press;
Munn K. & Smith B. (Eds.). (2008). Applied ontology: An introduction. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag;
Nemeroff C. B., Weinberger D., Rutter M., MacMillan H. L., Bryant R. A., Wessely S., … Lysaker 
P. (2013). DSM-5: A collection of psychiatrist views on the changes, controversies, and future 
directions. BMC Med, 11, p. 202;
Nordgaard J., Sass L. A. & Parnas J. (2013). The psychiatric interview: Validity, structure, and 
subjectivity. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 263(4), pp. 353-364;
North Carol S. & Surís Alina M. (2017). Advances in psychiatric diagnosis: Past, present, and 
future. Behavioral Sciences, 7(2), p. 27;
Pallagrosi M., Picardi A., Fonzi L. & Biondi,M. (2018). Psychopathological dimensions and the 
clinician’s subjective experience. In M. Biondi, M. Pasquini, & A. Picardi (Eds.), Dimensional 
psychopathology (pp. 267-286). Cham: Springer International Publishing;
Parnas J. (2014). The RDoC program: Psychiatry without psyche? World Psychiatry 13(1), 
pp. 46-47;
Parnas J. & Zahavi D. (2002). The role of phenomenology in psychiatric diagnosis and 
classification. In M. Maj, W. Gaebel, J. J. López-Ibor, & N. Sartorius (Eds.), Psychiatric diagnosis 
and classification. New York: John Wiley & Sons;
Parnas J., Moller P., Kircher T., Thalbitzer J., Jansson L., Handest P. & Zahavi D. (2005). EASE: 
Examination of anomalous self-experience. Psychopathology, 38(5), pp. 236-258;
Parnas J., Sass L. A. & Zahavi D. (2013). Rediscovering psychopathology: The epistemology and 
phenomenology of the psychiatric object. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 39 (2), pp. 270–277;
Patel V., Saxena S., Lund C. … Unützer J. (2018). The Lancet Commission on global mental 
health and sustainable development. The Lancet, 392, No. 10157;
Patrick C. J. & Hajcak G. (2016). RDoC: Translating promise into progress. Psychophysiology, 53(3), 
pp. 415-424;
Poldrack, Russell A., Baker, Chris I., Durnez, Joke, Gorgolewski, Krzysztof J., Matthews, Paul 
M., Munafò, Marcus R., … Yarkoni, Tal. (2017). Scanning the horizon: Towards transparent and 
reproducible neuroimaging research. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 18, pp. 115-125;
Ramos-Gorostiza P. & Adan-Manes J. (2013). The problem of psychopathology and 
phenomenology. What is viable and not viable in phenomenological psychiatry. Actas Esp 
Psiquiatr, 41(5), pp. 301-310;
Rosfort R. & Stanghellini G. (2014). How do you feel? Why emotions matter in psychiatry. 
Journal of Psychopathology, 20, pp. 381-392;
Seppälä S., Ruttenberg A. & Smith B. (2017). Guidelines for writing definitions in ontologies. 
Ciência da Informação, 46(1), pp. 73-88;
Smith B. (2008). New desiderata for biomedical terminologies. In K. Munn & B. Smith (Eds.), 
Applied ontology: An introduction (pp. 83-108). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag;
219
MAPPING THE PATIENT’S EXPERIENCE
Smith B. & Ceusters W. (2010). Ontological Realism as a methodology for coordinated evolution 
of scientific ontologies. Applied Ontology, 5, pp. 139-188;
Smith B., Ashburner M., Ceusters W., Goldberg L., Mungall C. J., Shah N., … Leontis N. (2007). 
The OBO Foundry: Coordinated evolution of ontologies to support biomedical data integration. 
Nature Biotechnology, 25(11), pp. 1251-1255;
Spjuth O., Krestyaninova M., Hastings J., Shen, Huei-Yi H., Jani, Waldenberger, … Harris J. 
(2015). Harmonising and linking biomedical and clinical data across disparate data archives to 
enable integrative cross-biobank research. European Journal of Human Genetics, 24, pp. 521-528;
Stanghellini G. (2016). Phenomenological psychopathology and care: From person-centered 
dialectical psychopathology to the PHD Method for psychotherapy. In G. Stanghellini & M. 
Aragona (Eds.), An experimental approach to psychopathology (pp. 361-378). Heidelberg: Springer;
Stanghellini G., Castellini G., Brogna P., Faravelli C. & Ricca V. (2012). Identity and eating 
disorders (IDEA): A questionnaire evaluating identity and embodiment in eating disorder 
patients. Psychopathology, 45(3), pp. 147-158;
Stanghellini G. & Rosfort R. (2013). Emotions and personhood: Exploring fragility - making sense of 
vulnerability. New York: Oxford University Press;
Stanghellini G. & Rossi R. (2014). Pheno-phenotypes: a holistic approach to the 
psychopathology of schizophrenia. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 27(3), pp. 236-241; 
Stanghellini G., Broome M., Fernandez A. V., Fusar-Poli P., Raballo A. & Rosfort R. (Eds.). (2018). 
The Oxford handbook of phenomenological psychopathology. New York: Oxford University Press;
Sullivan J. A. (2017). Coordinated pluralism as a means to facilitate integrative taxonomies of 
cognition. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), pp. 129-145;
Wainberg M. L., Scorza P., Shultz J. M., Helpman L., Mootz J. J., Johnson K. A., … Arbuckle 
M. R. (2017). Challenges and Opportunities in Global Mental Health: a Research-to-Practice 
Perspective. Current psychiatry reports, 19(5), 28-28. doi:10.1007/s11920-017-0780-z;
Whiteford H. A., Degenhardt L., Rehm J., Baxter A. J., Ferrari A. J., Erskine H. E., …Vos, T. (2013). 
Global burden of disease attributable to mental and substance use disorders: Findings from the 
Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. The Lancet, 382(9904), pp. 1575-1586;
WHO. (2017). Depression. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/
detail/depression;
Wiggins O. P., Schwartz M. A. (2011). Phenomenological psychiatry needs a big tent. Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, & Psychology, 18(1), pp. 31-32; 
Wrigley A. (2007). Realism and Anti-Realism about mental illness. Philosophical Papers, 36(3), 
pp. 371-397;
Zahavi D. (2003). Husserl’s phenomenology: Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press;
Zahavi D. (Ed.) (2012). The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology. New York: Oxford 
University Press;
Zahavi D. (Ed.) (2018a). The Oxford handbook of the history of phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press;
Zahavi D. (2018b). Getting it quite wrong: Van Manen and Smith on phenomenology. Qualitative 
Health Research, 26(6), pp. 900-907.
